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Abstract 
Background and objectives  
People who experience auditory hallucinations tend to show weak reality discrimination 
skills, so that they misattribute internal, self-generated events to an external, non-self source. 
We examined whether inducing negative affect in healthy young adults would increase their 
tendency to make external misattributions on a reality discrimination task.  
Methods  
Participants (N=54) received one of three mood inductions (one positive, two negative) and 
then performed an auditory signal detection task to assess reality discrimination.  
Results  
Participants who received either of the two negative inductions made more false alarms, but 
not more hits, than participants who received the neutral induction, indicating that negative 
affect makes participants more likely to misattribute internal, self-generated events to an 
external, non-self source.  
Limitations  
These findings are drawn from an analogue sample, and research that examines whether 
negative affect also impairs reality discrimination in patients who experience auditory 
hallucinations is required. 
Conclusions  
These findings show that negative affect disrupts reality discrimination and suggest one way 
in which negative affect may lead to hallucinatory experiences. 
 
Keywords: reality discrimination; signal detection; self-monitoring; hallucinations; negative 
affect  
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1. Introduction 
The process of differentiating between internal, self-generated events and external, 
non-self-generated events is sometimes referred to as reality monitoring (Bentall, 1990) or 
reality discrimination (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011; here we will use the latter term, as 
the term reality monitoring is more often used in source memory research, e.g., Johnson & 
Raye, 1981). Cognitive models of auditory hallucinations (AH) suggest that AH occur when 
internal events (e.g., intrusive thoughts, inner speech) are misattributed to an external agent 
(e.g., Bentall, 1990; Frith, 1992; Hoffman, 1986). Thus, patients who experience AH should 
show weak reality discrimination abilities. One way in which reality discrimination abilities 
are commonly measured in patients with AH is through an auditory signal detection task 
(SDT; e.g., Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, McKie, & Lewis, 2007). In the SDT, participants must 
try to detect a signal (typically one second of neutral, non-emotional speech) in an ambiguous 
auditory stimulus (typically five seconds of white noise). On some trials the speech is present, 
on other trials the speech is absent. Reality discrimination errors occur when a participant 
makes a false alarm—that is, when they perceive speech to be present in the white noise 
when it is absent. Presumably, when a false alarm occurs, participants have mistaken their 
internal, self-generated representation of the speech for the external, ‘real’ speech. Consistent 
with current models, when performing a SDT, patients who experience AH show an 
externalizing bias, whereby they are more likely than controls to report that speech is present 
in the noise, even when it is absent (e.g., Bentall & Slade, 1985; Varese et al., 2012; 
Vercammen, de Haan, & Aleman, 2008; Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2012).   
At present, it is unclear why people who experience AH show this externalizing bias. 
Studies that have examined the antecedents or triggers of AH may suggest some variables 
that elicit this bias, as presumably problems in reality discrimination peak at times when a 
person experiences an AH. In Nayani and David’s (1996) study of the phenomenology of 
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AH, the majority of voice-hearers reported that some form of negative affect preceded the 
onset of hallucinations. These findings have been supported by studies that have employed 
experience sampling methods (ESM), which can assess the antecedents and correlates of 
psychotic experiences in “the flow of daily life” (Myin-Germeys & van Os, 2007, p. 411). In 
one ESM study, participants reported that AH tended to occur in the context of negative 
affect (Delespaul, de Vries, & van Os, 2002). Importantly, as these cross-sectional 
associations might reflect the influence of AH upon mood, Delespaul et al. (2002) also 
reported that negative affect increased before the onset of AH. This suggests that negative 
affect may play a causal role in the development of AH. As noted by Freeman and Garety 
(2003), while a number of authors have proposed that negative affect may play a role in the 
development of AH, these accounts tend to focus on how affect influences the content or 
appraisal of AH (e.g., Morrison, 1998), rather than on how affect might modulate the 
cognitive processes that can trigger AH. There is, therefore, no theoretical account of how 
emotion might influence reality discrimination, nor any account of how emotion might 
influence apparently related processes such as self-monitoring. 
Feelings of loneliness may also modulate reality discrimination. Loneliness is the 
perception that one’s interpersonal relationships are unsatisfying (Peplau & Perlman, 1982), 
and it has been shown to be related to, but distinct from, depression and other forms of 
negative affect (Cacioppo et al., 2006). For example, Cacioppo et al. (2006) reported that 
factor analysis of questionnaire items that assess depression and loneliness load onto two 
separate, but correlated factors. Psychotic patients have reported that feelings of loneliness 
(Delespaul et al., 2002) or being alone (Nayani & David, 1996; Tarrier, 1987) precede the 
onset of AH. Feelings of loneliness tend to elicit high levels of negative affect (Cacioppo, 
Hawkley, & Thisted, 2010) and this may be one way in which loneliness affects reality 
discrimination. However, it is possible that loneliness also influences reality discrimination 
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through an additional mechanism. Hoffman (2007) has proposed that social isolation (a 
concept related, but not identical, to loneliness; see de Jong Gierveld, 1998) can lead to a bias 
where a person begins to attribute social meaning to non-social events and that, in this way, 
social isolation might play a causal role in the development of AH. For example, high levels 
of isolation, or intense feelings of loneliness, might encourage an internal, self-generated 
event, such as inner speech, to be misinterpreted as an external, social event (i.e., as speech 
directed at you by another person) and this erroneous attribution could form the basis of an 
AH. Through this bias, as well as by eliciting negative affect, loneliness may make a person 
struggle to differentiate internal, self-generated from external, other-generated events. 
Therefore, in this study we examined whether experimentally-induced feelings of 
loneliness, or negative affect more generally, could impair participants’ reality discrimination 
abilities. A mood induction procedure that has been widely used to examine the impact of 
loneliness on social cognition (e.g., by Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004) was employed to 
do this. In this procedure, three inductions are used. All involve participants recalling and 
writing about an autobiographical memory. One induction requires participants to write about 
their journey from home to the laboratory and aims to elicit a neutral mood. One induction 
involves participants recalling a time when they failed at an academic task; this has been 
shown to elicit negative affect (Pickett et al., 2004). The third induction involves participants 
recalling a time when they felt intensely lonely; this manipulation has been shown to elicit 
negative affect and feelings of loneliness (Chen, Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008; Pickett 
et al., 2004). In previous studies, the loneliness induction has influenced a variety of 
behaviors related to social cognition (such as prosody processing and a desire to listen to the 
disclosure of emotional information by friends), but the failure induction has not influenced 
these behaviors (Hackenbracht & Gasper, 2013; Pickett et al., 2004). These findings have 
been used to support arguments that feelings of loneliness elicit a set of cognitive biases 
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independent of negative affect. Employing this design in the present study allowed us to 
examine whether there was any effect of negative affect on reality discrimination, and to 
explore the possibility of an effect of feelings of loneliness on reality discrimination that 
could be either (a) independent of negative affect, if the failure induction did not influence 
reality discrimination, or (b) in addition to negative affect, if the failure induction influenced 
reality discrimination, but to a smaller extent than did the loneliness induction.  
In the SDT, several different parameters can be calculated. These include hits (trials 
where participants correctly report that speech was present in the white noise), false alarms 
(trials where participants incorrectly report that speech was present in the white noise), 
sensitivity (which indicates participants’ ability to discriminate between trials when speech is 
present and trials when speech is absent), and response bias (which indicates participants’ 
tendency, across all trials, towards responding that speech is present in the noise). We 
predicted that participants who received the two negative inductions would make more false 
alarms, but not more hits, than participants who received the neutral induction. This pattern 
of results should correspond to lower levels of sensitivity and a more liberal response bias in 
participants who received the two negative inductions in comparison to participants who 
received the neutral induction. We also predicted that participants who received the 
loneliness induction would make more false alarms, demonstrate lower sensitivity, and show 
a more liberal response bias on the SDT than participants who received the failure induction, 
as the loneliness induction could elicit an increase in external misattributions via both 
negative affect and the bias described by Hoffman (2007).  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 54 university students (45 women; mean age = 22.08 years, SD = 
5.9), who received course credit in return for their time. Participants were native English 
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speakers, had normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision, and had no history of hearing 
problems. 
2.2 Mood induction 
The mood induction described in study two of Pickett et al. (2004) was employed 
here. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three induction groups: a loneliness 
induction, a failure induction, and a neutral induction. In the loneliness induction, participants 
were asked to recall and write down an account of a time when they felt intensely lonely. In 
the failure induction, participants were asked to recall and write down an account of a time 
when they experienced an academic failure. In the neutral induction, participants were asked 
to recall and write down an account of their journey to the department that day. Participants 
were asked to spend a minimum of five minutes and a maximum of eight minutes on this 
task. Participants who completed the task in less than five minutes were asked to try to recall 
more details about their recalled event, and to write about these details. Previous studies have 
reported that the failure induction effectively elicits negative affect and that the lonely 
induction effectively elicits both negative affect and feelings of loneliness (Bernstein, Young, 
Brown, Sacco, & Claypool, 2008; Chen et al., 2008; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister & Schaller, 
2007; Pickett et al., 2004; Wilkowski, Robinson, & Friesen, 2009). 
2.3 Reality discrimination task 
A signal detection task (SDT) similar to that described by Barkus et al. (2007) was 
employed to assess reality discrimination. This task consisted of 60 trials, with each trial 
consisting of five seconds of white noise. In 36 trials, one second of speech was presented in 
the white noise. In the remaining 24 trials, no speech was presented. In 12 of the trials when 
speech was presented, the speech was clearly audible. In the remaining 24 trials, the speech 
was presented at an auditory threshold. This threshold was determined prior to the start of 
testing by establishing the volume of speech that was perceived by 50% of a small sample (n 
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= 11) of participants who were in the same age range as the experimental participants. The 
stimuli for the speech were prepared from a recording of an adult reading a piece of non-
fictional prose in an emotionally neutral tone. Twelve, one second segments of speech were 
taken from this recording. Each segment of speech was presented once at the clearly audible 
volume and twice at the auditory threshold volume. The task was presented to participants on 
a laptop computer via the experiment software E-Prime 2.0. Participants listened to the task 
stimuli using standard Sony headphones and responded via a button press at the end of each 
trial.  
The number of hits (trials where participants correctly reported that speech had been 
present in the white noise) and false alarms (trials where participants incorrectly reported that 
speech had been present in the white noise) made by participants were recorded. A greater 
number of false alarms indicated weaker reality discrimination skills. Sensitivity was 
assessed by calculating d’, which is found by subtracting the z-score of the false alarm rate 
from the z-score of the hit rate. Higher d’ values indicate greater ability to discriminate 
between trials where speech was present and speech was absent. Response bias was assessed 
by calculating nonparametric β, as described in Barkus et al. (2007). Nonparametric β can 
vary from 1 to -1. Values near to 1 indicate a more conservative response bias (i.e., a bias 
towards responding that the speech is absent), and values further from 1 indicate a more 
liberal response bias (i.e., a bias towards responding that the speech is present). 
2.4 Additional measures and rating of recalled memories 
Participants were also asked to complete the UCLA loneliness scale (Russell, 1996) 
and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Inclusion 
of these measures allowed us to examine whether there were pre-existing group differences in 
loneliness, depression, or anxiety, and if so, to control for these differences. 
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Following Pickett et al. (2004), to assess the effectiveness of the mood inductions, 
participants rated how positive or negative the recalled event was (1 = very negative; 7 = very 
positive), the valence of the mood that was generated by recalling the event (1 = very 
negative; 7 = very positive), and how the event made them feel about themselves (1 = very 
bad about myself; 7 = very good about myself). Given that the failure and the loneliness 
inductions were meant to elicit similar levels of negative affect, it was predicted that there 
would be no significant differences in participants’ ratings of how negative the failure and the 
loneliness memories were, of the valence of the mood generated by recalling the failure and 
the loneliness memories, and of how bad they felt about themselves after recalling the failure 
and the loneliness memories. However, we expected that the ratings provided by participants 
who completed the neutral induction would differ from the ratings provided by participants 
who completed the failure and the loneliness inductions.  
In addition, two independent raters, who were blind to the study’s hypotheses, 
provided ratings of the emotions described in the memories. Each rater was asked to read the 
memory and rate to what extent the person who wrote the memory had felt distressed, upset, 
isolated, disappointed, embarrassed, and lonely in the situation they described. For each 
descriptor, the rater responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = 
extremely). The raters’ responses for ‘distressed’ and ‘upset’ were summed, as were the 
responses for ‘disappointed’ and ‘embarrassed’, and the responses for ‘isolated’ and ‘lonely’. 
Inter-rater reliability was established by calculating correlation coefficients for these three 
variables. Correlations between their ratings of how distressed and upset (r = .80, p < .001), 
of how disappointed and embarrassed (r = .75, p < .001), and of how isolated and lonely (r = 
.88, p < .001) participants felt in the memories indicated that there were acceptable levels of 
inter-rater reliability. The responses of the two raters were summed, so that for these three 
variables, total ratings could range from 4 to 20. It was predicted that (a) the two negative 
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memories would be rated as describing events that made the participant feel more distressed 
and upset than the neutral memories, (b) that the failure memories would be rated as 
describing events that made the participant feel more disappointed and embarrassed than in 
the neutral and loneliness memories, and (c) that the loneliness memories would be rated as 
describing events that made the participant feel more isolated and lonely than the neutral and 
failure memories. 
2.5 Procedure 
The study was approved by a departmental ethics committee and was conducted in 
accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. To avoid the demand 
characteristics associated with some mood inductions (see Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 
1981), participants were deceived about the true purpose of this study. The study was 
advertised as research examining links between memory specificity and auditory processing. 
On arrival at the laboratory, this was reiterated, and participants were told that they would 
perform the ‘memory specificity task’ first, that this task would involve recalling a memory 
and writing about it in as much detail as possible, and that an auditory processing task would 
then be completed. Participants then completed a set of six practice trials for the SDT, to 
ensure that they understood the task and that they could tolerate the white noise. They were 
presented with two trials where the speech was clearly audible in the white noise, followed by 
two trials where the speech was presented at an auditory threshold, and then two trials where 
the speech was absent. After completing the practice trials, participants confirmed that they 
could tolerate the white noise and were informed about what type of trials had been 
presented. 
After providing consent, participants were read a set of instructions about the type of 
memory they were to recall. Participants who were assigned to the failure or loneliness 
induction, but could not recall a time when they felt intensely lonely, or a time when they felt 
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they had failed at an academic task, were re-assigned to the neutral induction. Four 
participants were re-assigned from the failure induction and five participants were re-
assigned from the loneliness induction. Following completion of the SDT, participants were 
presented with the self-report measures. Following completion of these measures, participants 
were informed that they had been deceived about the true purpose of the study, were asked 
whether they suspected that they had been deceived, and were fully debriefed. None of the 
participants guessed the true nature of the study. They were then invited to ‘repair’ their 
mood by watching a short clip of their choice from a variety of comedy television series. 
2.6 Statistical analysis 
 Data were analysed using SPSS version 20. Gender differences were assessed using t-
tests. A series of one-way ANOVAs were used to analyse the features of the recalled 
memories and to investigate the effect of the mood inductions. Where appropriate, ANOVA 
was followed by planned contrasts. In all instances, the first contrast was between mean 
scores in the neutral group versus the combined means of the two negative induction groups, 
with the second contrast between the means of the failure and loneliness groups.  
3. Results 
3.1 Loneliness, depression, and anxiety 
Mean scores for loneliness, depression, and anxiety are presented in Table 1. Group 
differences in levels of depression, anxiety, and loneliness were not significant (all F-values 
< 1.5, all p-values > .24) and so these variables are not considered in any of the subsequent 
analysis. 
3.2 Gender differences 
 Given the unbalanced nature of the sample, we investigated the influence of gender on 
number of false alarms, number of hits, d’, and β values. When looking at the whole sample, 
gender differences were not significant (all p-values > .14), except for a trend level difference 
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in d’, t(52) = 1.74, p = .09, d = 0.62. Men (M = 1.80, SD = 0.54) had marginally higher d’ 
values than did women (M = 1.45, SD = 0.56). However, this difference appears to be a 
function of the large proportion of men (five of nine) who were assigned to the neutral group. 
When gender differences were examined within each mood induction group, there were no 
differences between men and women (all p-values > .28). Gender is not, therefore, considered 
in the subsequent analyses. 
3.3 Analysis of recalled memories and manipulation check 
The amount of time spent on recalling and writing about a memory did not differ 
between the three induction groups, F(2, 53) = 1.70, p = .19. However, the number of words 
written by participants in the three induction groups did differ, F(2, 53) = 3.79, p = .03. 
Participants in the neutral group wrote the most words (M = 231.11, SD = 40.89), followed 
by participants in the lonely group (M = 196.50, SD = 57.25), with participants in the failure 
group writing the fewest words (M = 191.61, SD = 40.76). Planned contrasts revealed that the 
neutral group wrote fewer words than participants in the two negative inductions, t(51) = 
2.73, p = .01, d = 0.75. The difference in number of words written between the failure and 
loneliness groups was not significant, t(51) = 0.31, p = .76, d = 0.01. Given that there was no 
reason to believe that the number of words participants wrote would influence their reality 
discrimination abilities, this variable was not considered in subsequent analyses. 
Mean scores for the self-report manipulation check scales are presented in Table 1. 
One-way ANOVA revealed significant group differences for memory valence, F(2, 51), = 
12.43, p < .001, for mood after recall, F(2, 51), = 15.26, p < .001, and at the trend level, for 
how participants felt about themselves after recall, F(2, 51), = 3.12, p = .06. Planned 
contrasts showed that participants in the two negative induction groups rated the memory 
they recalled as more negative than did the participants in the neutral induction group, t(51) = 
4.90, p < .001, d = 1.20, but that differences between the ratings made by participants in the 
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failure and loneliness inductions did not reach statistical significance, t(51) = 0.82, p = .42, d 
= 0.32.  Planned contrasts showed that participants in the two negative induction groups rated 
their mood as more negative after having recalled the memory than did the participants in the 
neutral induction group, t(51) = 5.51, p < .001, d = 1.29, but that differences between the 
ratings made by participants in the failure and loneliness inductions did not reach statistical 
significance, t(51) = 0.34, p = .73, d = 0.09.  Planned contrasts showed that participants in the 
two negative induction groups reported feeling worse about themselves after having recalled 
the memory than did the participants in the neutral induction group, t(51) = 2.45, p = .02, d = 
0.68, but that differences between the ratings made by participants in the failure and 
loneliness inductions did not reach statistical significance, t(51) = 0.16, p = .88, d = 0.05.   
 Mean scores for the blind ratings of participants’ memories are also presented in 
Table 1. One-way ANOVA revealed significant group differences for how distressed and 
upset participants appeared to have felt, F(2, 51), = 60.14, p < .001, for how disappointed and 
embarrassed participants appeared to have felt F(2, 51), = 75.46, p < .001, and for how 
isolated and lonely participants appeared to have felt, F(2, 51), = 30.23, p < .001. Planned 
contrasts revealed that participants were rated as appearing more distressed and upset in the 
two negative memories than they did in the neutral memory, t(51) = 10.85, p < .001, d = 1.74, 
but that differences between participants in the loneliness and failure condition did not reach 
statistical significance for this variable, t(51) = 1.63, p = .11, d = 0.47. Planned contrasts 
revealed that participants were rated as appearing more disappointed and embarrassed in the 
two negative memories than they did in the neutral memory, t(51) = 7.15, p < .001, d = 1.42, 
and that participants appeared more disappointed and embarrassed in the failure memory than 
they did in the loneliness memory, t(51) = 3.07, p =.003, d = 0.78.  Finally, planned contrasts 
revealed that participants were rated as appearing more isolated and lonely in the two 
negative memories than they did in the neutral memory, t(51) = 8.10, p < .001, d = 1.20, and 
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that participants appeared more isolated and lonely in the loneliness memory than they did in 
the failure memory, t(51) = 9.24, p < .001, d = 1.56. 
3.4 SDT performance 
 Descriptive statistics for the measures of SDT performance are shown in Table 1. 
There was a main effect of induction on the number of false alarms participants made, F(2, 
51) = 3.83, p = .03. Participants in the failure group made the most false alarms, followed by 
participants in the loneliness group, with participants in the neutral group making the fewest 
false alarms. Planned contrasts revealed that the neutral group made fewer false alarms than 
participants in the two negative inductions, t(51) = 2.45, p = .02, d = 0.75. The difference in 
number of false alarms between the failure and loneliness groups was not significant, t(51) = 
1.29, p = .20, d = 0.39, and was in the direction opposite to that predicted. In contrast, with 
respect to number of hits, there was no effect of induction, F(2, 51) = 0.49, p = .62.  
There was a main effect of induction on d’, F(2, 51) = 4.88, p = .01. d’ values were 
lowest in the failure group, followed by the loneliness group, with d’ values highest in the 
neutral group. Planned contrasts revealed that d’ was higher in the neutral group than the two 
negative inductions, t(51) = 2.72, p = .01, d = 0.73. The difference in d’ between the failure 
and loneliness groups was not significant t(51) = 1.54, p = .13, d = 0.51. Again, this 
difference was in the direction opposite to that predicted (d’ values were predicted to be 
lower in the loneliness group). 
Finally, at the trend level, there was a main effect of induction on β, F(2, 51) = 3.02, p 
= .06. β values were lowest in the failure group, followed by the loneliness group, with β 
values highest in the neutral group. Planned contrasts revealed that β was higher in the neutral 
group than the two negative inductions, t(51) = 2.32, p = .02, d = 0.65. The difference 
between the failure and loneliness groups was not significant t(51) = 0.80, p = .42, d = 0.27. 
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Again, this difference was in the direction opposite to that predicted (β values were predicted 
to be lower in the loneliness group). 
4. Discussion 
The present study set out to examine whether experimentally-induced negative affect 
and feelings of loneliness could elicit an externalizing bias when participants performed a 
reality discrimination task. Participants who received either of the negative inductions made 
more external misattributions than did participants who received a neutral mood induction. 
Importantly, the negative inductions did not appear to impair participants’ performance in all 
aspects of the task. That is, participants who received the two negative inductions made the 
same number of hits as did participants who received the neutral induction. This indicates 
that the negative inductions did not impair participants’ ability to detect a signal when it was 
present, but that they specifically made participants were more likely to misattribute internal, 
self-generated events to an external, non-self source. 
If it is assumed that a person’s reality discrimination skills are weakest, and that they 
are most likely to make an external misattribution, at times when they experience AH, these 
findings can be considered consistent with a number of studies. Nayani and David (1996), 
Tarrier (1987), and Delespaul et al. (2002) have all reported that some form of negative affect 
tends to occur around the onset of AH. While Nayani and David’s and Tarrier’s studies relied 
on retrospective reporting, Delespaul et al.’s ESM data provided evidence that anxiety 
precedes the onset of AH, suggesting that negative affect plays a causal role in the day-to-day 
onset of AH in voice-hearers. The present findings are consistent with this suggestion, and 
indicate one mechanism by which negative affect can cause AH. It is possible that negative 
affect might lead to AH through other mechanisms (e.g., by increasing the likelihood that a 
person will experience intrusive, unpleasant thoughts that are difficult to identify as internal, 
self-generated events), and future research should examine whether this is the case. 
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More broadly, by demonstrating that negative affect elicits a bias considered to be 
important in the development of AH, these findings are consistent with approaches that have 
emphasized the importance of affective problems in the development of psychotic 
experiences (Freeman & Garety, 2003). These approaches (e.g., Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, 
Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001) typically focus on the way in which emotion may influence 
the content of AH (e.g., depression may cause a person to hear a voice telling them that they 
are worthless) or on the way in which a person responds to a hallucinatory experience (e.g., 
anxiety may cause a person to respond to a threatening voice in a fearful, subordinate 
manner). The present study, however, suggests that these accounts should also consider the 
possibility that emotional problems may elicit the biases that help to trigger AH. 
Given that reality discrimination problems are thought to underlie AH, our results 
might be interpreted as suggesting that whenever a person experiences negative affect, they 
are likely to experience AH. This, however, seems unlikely. It seems more plausible that AH 
occur in the presence of a number of predisposing factors. That is, AH may only occur when 
a person who has a trait-like weakness in reality discrimination, experiences both high levels 
of negative affect, which act to exacerbate their difficulties with reality discrimination, and 
intrusive cognitions, which tend to be difficult to identify as self-generated (Bentall, 2003). 
This account is consistent with the findings of the present study, with experience sampling 
data (e.g., Delespaul et al., 2002), and with current cognitive models of AH (Waters, Badock, 
Michie, & Mayberry, 2006). 
The lack of any specific effect of the loneliness induction on reality discrimination 
performance could be considered to be inconsistent with Hoffman’s (2007) suggestion that 
social isolation might play a role in the development of AH. Hoffman has argued that social 
isolation creates a bias so that a person will begin to attribute social meaning to non-social 
events. Given the associations between loneliness and social isolation (e.g., Golden, Conroy, 
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Bruce, Denihan, Greene, Kirby, & Lawlor, 2009), it seems likely that loneliness will 
encourage a person to attribute social meaning to non-social events. And, given that internal, 
self-generated events tend to be non-social while external, non-self-generated events may 
often be social (e.g., they may be instances of another person talking to you), we predicted 
that loneliness would elicit an externalizing bias. While participants who received the 
loneliness induction did make more external misattributions than participants who received 
the neutral induction, they did not make more external misattributions than participants who 
received the failure induction, suggesting that feelings of loneliness do not elicit an 
externalizing bias independent of negative affect. It could be argued that this is simply a 
result of employing an ineffective loneliness induction. However, this induction has been 
used successfully in a range of studies to elicit feelings of loneliness and a set of biases 
associated with high levels of loneliness (e.g., Chen et al., 2008; Wilkowski et al., 2009). In 
addition, in the present study, using two independent raters who were blind to the study’s 
hypotheses, we showed that participants in the loneliness condition recalled situations that 
featured higher levels of loneliness and isolation than did participants in either of the two 
other conditions. Thus, it seems unlikely that the loneliness induction was ineffective. Rather, 
given that Hoffman’s hypothesis focuses on objective social isolation, rather than feelings of 
isolation or loneliness, it is possible that only a procedure that involves isolating participants 
from human contact, rather than simply asking them to recall a time when they felt isolated 
from others, would elicit the kind of bias Hoffman described. Future research should thus 
examine the effects of social isolation on reality discrimination and other aspects of self-
monitoring. 
Negative affect may have elicited an externalizing bias in this study through a number 
of different mechanisms. One possibility is that good reality discrimination abilities rely upon 
intact working memory, that negative affect interferes with working memory capacity, and in 
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this way impairs reality discrimination. This interpretation is suggested by research showing 
that (a) participants are less likely to identify themselves as the agent of an action (and so will 
presumably be more likely to display an externalizing bias) when working memory load is 
increased (Hon, Poh, & Soon, 2013), and (b) negative affect reduces working memory 
capacity (Elzinga & Roelofs, 2005; Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008). Research that examines 
whether impairments in working memory mediate the effect of negative affect on reality 
discrimination is required.  
One limitation of the present study was the way in which participants were allocated 
to a mood induction condition, as this was non-random for a sub-group of participants. Nine 
participants who were randomly assigned to one of the two negative inductions were unable 
to recall a time when they had experienced an academic failure or when they had experienced 
intense feelings of loneliness, and so were re-allocated to the neutral condition. While it 
seems unlikely that the reality discrimination abilities of these participants will have differed 
from the reality discrimination abilities of the participants who were able to complete the 
negative inductions, it remains a possibility. Research that examines the question investigated 
here, but that employs an induction that is not vulnerable to this kind of problem (e.g., 
Robinson & Sahakian, 2009), would be helpful. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for all study variables 
 Neutral Failure Loneliness 
Reality discrimination performance    
Mean number of false alarms (SD) 23.22 (3.51) 27.17 (4.64) 25.33 (4.50) 
Mean number of hits (SD) 24.44 (3.17) 25.67 (3.01) 25.11 (4.75) 
Mean d’ (SD) 21.79 (0.56) 21.23 (0.55) 21.50 (0.49) 
Mean β (SD) 20.46 (0.44) 20.12 (0.37) 20.23 (0.48) 
Ancillary measures    
Mean loneliness (SD) 39.50 (7.57) 37.28 (8.13) 38.50 (7.36) 
Mean depression (SD) 35.17 (4.05) 34.17 (2.83) 33.33 (2.66) 
Mean anxiety (SD) 39.33 (4.64) 38.61 (3.45) 38.33 (4.43) 
Manipulation checks — Self-reports    
Mean memory valence (SD) 4.70 (1.05) 2.17 (0.87) 1.83 (0.75) 
Mean mood after recall (SD) 5.03 (1.13) 3.43 (1.01) 3.23 (0.82) 
Mean felt about self after recall (SD) 4.53 (0.82) 3.43 (0.90) 3.73 (0.98) 
Manipulation checks — Blind ratings    
Distressed and upset mean (SD) 5.06 (1.83) 12.94 (3.59) 14.44 (2.57) 
Embarrassed and disappointed mean (SD) 4.06 (0.24) 11.61 (3.94) 18.61 (3.20) 
Lonely and isolated mean (SD) 4.06 (0.24) 16.44 (4.34) 15.67 (2.82) 
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Fig. 1. Mean (a) number of false alarms, (b), number of hits, (c), d’ and (d) β in the three 
mood induction groups. 
 
 
 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
0
2
4
6
8
10
Neutral Failure Loneliness
M
e
a
n
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
a
l
s
e
 
a
l
a
r
m
s
(a)
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Neutral Failure Loneliness
False Alarms 3.22 7.17 5.33 False Alarms
0.83 1.09 1.08
Neutral Failure Loneliness
Hits 24.44 25.67 25.11 Hits
0.75 0.71 1.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
d' 1.79 1.23 1.5 d'
0.13 0.13 0.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
β 0.46 0.12 0.24 β
0.1 0.09 0.11
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Control Group Induction Groups
3.22 6.25
0.83 0.66
Control Group Induction Groups
24.44 25.39
0.75 0.77
Control Group Induction Groups
1.79 1.365
0.13 0.09
Control Group Induction Groups
0.46 0.18
0.1 0.07
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
20
22
24
26
28
30
Neutral Failure Loneliness
M
e
a
n
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
h
i
t
s
(b)
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Neutral Failure Loneliness
False Alarms 3.22 7.17 5.33 False Alarms
0.83 1.09 1.08
Neutral Failure Loneliness
Hits 24.44 25.67 25.11 Hits
0.75 0.71 1.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
d' 1.79 1.23 1.5 d'
0.13 0.13 0.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
β 0.46 0.12 0.24 β
0.1 0.09 0.11
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Control Group Induction Groups
3.22 6.25
0.83 0.66
Control Group Induction Groups
24.44 25.39
0.75 0.77
Control Group Induction Groups
1.79 1.365
0.13 0.09
Control Group Induction Groups
0.46 0.18
0.1 0.07
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
Neutral Failure Loneliness
M
e
a
n
 
d
'
(c)
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Neutral Failure Loneliness
False Alarms 3.22 7.17 5.33 False Alarms
0.83 1.09 1.08
Neutral Failure Loneliness
Hits 24.44 25.67 25.11 Hits
0.75 0.71 1.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
d' 1.79 1.23 1.5 d'
0.13 0.13 0.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
β 0.46 0.12 0.24 β
0.1 0.09 0.11
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Control Group Induction Groups
3.22 6.25
0.83 0.66
Control Group Induction Groups
24.44 25.39
0.75 0.77
Control Group Induction Groups
1.79 1.365
0.13 0.09
Control Group Induction Groups
0.46 0.18
0.1 0.07
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Neutral Failure Loneliness
M
e
a
n
 
β
(d)
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Neutral Failure Loneliness
False Alarms 3.22 7.17 5.33 False Alarms
0.83 1.09 1.08
Neutral Failure Loneliness
Hits 24.44 25.67 25.11 Hits
0.75 0.71 1.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
d' 1.79 1.23 1.5 d'
0.13 0.13 0.12
Neutral Failure Loneliness
β 0.46 0.12 0.24 β
0.1 0.09 0.11
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Control Group Induction Groups
3.22 6.25
0.83 0.66
Control Group Induction Groups
24.44 25.39
0.75 0.77
Control Group Induction Groups
1.79 1.365
0.13 0.09
Control Group Induction Groups
0.46 0.18
0.1 0.07
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
• Reality discrimination errors are thought to underlie hallucinations. 
• We examined whether negative affect impaired reality discrimination. 
• Induced negative affect disrupted reality discrimination. 
• This may be one way in which negative affect leads to hallucinatory experiences. 
